Here we go again

Another death warrant and more personal jurisdiction

The Florida Supreme Court issued opinions on Thursday, including a handful of rules cases (bar rules and two appellate rule changes, here and here) and a death penalty case. We went back to law school (again) for a personal jurisdiction case that turned into three opinions and 52 pages at the Third DCA. And the governor signed a new death warrant.

Gaskin’s turn

Last week, Governor DeSantis signed a death warrant for Louis B. Gaskin. The execution will be April 12, 2023, unless the courts intervene or the governor grants last-minute clemency. Melanie Kalmanson’s Tracking Florida’s Death Penalty has coverage here and here. On Monday, the Florida Supreme Court issued the briefing schedule for trial court and appellate proceedings (below).

Screenshot of Florida Supreme Court’s scheduling order.

The trial court held a couple case management hearings and then entered an order denying Gaskin’s requests for additional public records from prior executions on Friday. According to the Florida Supreme Court’s scheduling order, the trial court proceedings will end this week and the first appellate brief is due next Tuesday.

As of this writing, Gaskin’s post-conviction motion and the state’s response are not on the docket but were due Saturday and Sunday, respectively. Typically there’s a delay between filing and public availability, especially when something’s filed over the weekend. The transcript from last Thursday’s case management hearing is here. We’ll track the filings and watch this case closely.

FSC denies postconviction relief in Sanchez-Torres

In the lone substantive opinion on Thursday, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief to Hector Sanchez-Torres. Sanchez-Torres is on death row for the murder of Erick Colon, which occurred as part of an armed robbery.

Sanchez-Torres’s co-perpetrator, Markeil Thomas, was a juvenile at the time of the crime and, therefore, not death-eligible. And because of a change in juvenile sentencing case law, Thomas is eligible for periodic review for parole.

In the postconviction proceedings under review, Sanchez-Torres argued there was new evidence showing Thomas confessed to being the triggerman in Colon’s murder but later recanted the testimony. Sanchez-Torres wanted to argue relative culpability and proportionality—that his death sentence was disproportionate because Thomas has the possibility of parole one day and had previously confessed (but later recanted) to being the shooter.

The Florida Supreme Court held that it didn't have to engage the relative culpability analysis because Thomas wasn’t eligible for the death penalty in the first place.

Also, there were independent aggravating factors apart from triggerman status. The court noted that the sentencing court didn’t rely on triggerman status in sentencing Sanchez-Torres to death, but instead relied on a prior murder conviction and the fact that Colon’s murder occurred during a robbery.

Dissent in the Districts!

The lone dissent came from Judge Lobree at the Third DCA, as part of a three-opinion, 52-page deep dive into personal jurisdiction called Mazda Motor Corp. v. Triche. Judge Logue wrote the majority opinion, holding that the Miami court had personal jurisdiction over Mazda Japan in a product liability case. Judge Lindsey concurred and wrote separately to address Judge Lobree’s dissent. Judge Lobree would’ve held that Mazda Japan didn’t purposely avail “itself of the privilege of conducting business here” and argued that the majority focused myopically on a statement from SCOTUS’s recent Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court in its analysis.

Each opinion in Mazda case walks through the greatest hits of personal jurisdiction and will either warm the hearts of former 1Ls or dig up old trauma, depending on one’s experience in Civ Pro. Our apologies to the latter, as this is two newsletters in a row containing a personal jurisdiction case.

And this one may not be over, as Mazda (unlike last week’s reputation-avenging video gamer) is exactly the litigant one would expect to take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court for clarification on the stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. We’ll be watching this one.

Concurring opinions around the state

Last week brought a few concurring opinions, too. Judge Gross concurred in a double jeopardy and standby counsel case, encouraging appellate courts to “recognize the ‘broad discretion’ of trial courts to guide what, if any, assistance’ standby counsel may provide and review such decisions accordingly.” To Gross, this would avoid “creating yet another legal Charybdis by imposing similar requirements [to Faretta] on the participation of standby counsel, once appointed.”

Also at the Fourth DCA, Judge Warner concurred in a contract case and wrote separately to clarify that the remand should be limited to the remaining attorney’s fees issue and is not meant to “give the appellees a second bite at the apple” on the other issues in the case.

Over at the Fifth, Judge Makar wrote a concurrence to a PCA to encourage the state to file responses to motions for post-conviction DNA testing in the trial courts. “A reasoned assessment from the State in these types of cases, however, would undoubtedly assist busy trial judges and facilitate their statutory obligations to make findings and decide whether relief is warranted.”

And Judge Edwards wrote a concurrence to a PCA just to point out that “Appellant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in any sense of the word.”

Miscellany

The Second DCA had a difficult statute of limitations issue in a school sex abuse lawsuit in which the plaintiff sued the Sarasota County School Board, prompting Judge Lucas to write:

We conclude by acknowledging the troubling result of our affirmance. These are hard cases. If we had the power to enact public policy, we would hold that a minor child’s right to seek civil redress against an allegedly negligent employer for its agent’s sexual abuse would not be subject to a curtailed time limitation simply because the employer happens to be the government. We don’t have that power; the legislature does.

Then Judge Lucas cc’ed the legislature: “If the legislature sees fit to remove this disparity between governmental and private defendants for claims such as those S.S. raises, it can amend section 768.28(14)—as, indeed, it has done in the past for other claims.”

The Third DCA affirmed a trial court’s finding of stand-your-ground immunity. In another case, the court wanted to “write only to commend the trial judge for her judicious handling of this contentious and difficult case.” For those interested, the trial judge was Judge Sharon Hamilton from Monroe County.

Back at the Fourth DCA, Judge Gerber penned a 5-part majority opinion complete with a mini law review article-esque roadmap, excerpts from the briefs and transcript, and photographs. And Judge Cohen at the Sixth DCA issued a periodic reminder that a claim for attorney’s fees needs to be requested in the pleadings.

Eyes on Flagler County

This week, we’ll be watching the Gaskin death warrant litigation as it concludes in the trial court. We’ll tweet updates @fla_ct_rev. And be sure to follow Tracking Florida’s Death Penalty.

Thank you for reading. If you like this content, please subscribe and tell your friends!